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Increasingly complex and autonomous systems require machine ethics to maximize the benets and minimize
the risks to society arising from the new technology. It is challenging to decide which type of ethical theory to
employ and how to implement it eectively. is survey provides a threefold contribution. Firstly, it introduces
a taxonomy to analyze the eld of machine ethics from an ethical, implementational, and technical perspective.
Secondly, an exhaustive selection and description of relevant works is presented. irdly, applying the new
taxonomy to the selected works, dominant research paerns and lessons for the eld are identied, and future
directions for research are suggested.
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Machine Ethics, Articial Morality
1 INTRODUCTION
Autonomous machines are increasingly taking over human tasks. Initially, simple and limited
assignments such as assembly line labor were taken over by machines. Nowadays, more complex
tasks are transferred to soware and robots. Even parts of jobs that were previously deemed
purely human occupations, such as being a driver, credit line assessor, medical doctor, or soldier
are progressively carried out by machines (e.g., [36, 42]). As many believe, ceding control over
important decisions to machines requires that they act in morally appropriate ways. Or, as Picard
puts it, “the greater the freedom of a machine, the more it will need moral standards” [102, p. 134].
For this reason, there has been a growing interest in Machine Ethics, dened as the discipline
“concerned with the consequences of machine behavior towards human users and other machines”[6,
p. 1].1 Research in this eld is a combination of computer science and moral philosophy. As a result,
publications range from theoretical essays on what a machine can or should do (e.g. [46, 122]), to
prototypes implementing ethics in a system (e.g., [3, 142]). In this eld, the emphasis lies on how a
machine could act ethically in an autonomous fashion.
ere have been several aempts to classify current approaches of machine ethics. A rst
high-level classication was proposed by Allen et al. [2] in 2005, distinguishing between top-down
theory-driven approaches, boom-up learning approaches, and hybrids of the two. Subsequent
work tried to further determine types of procedures [29, 65, 147], but these works were either
mixing dierent dimensions (e.g., mixing technical approach and ethical theory in one category)
[147] or oering an orthogonal dimension that did not t the existing taxonomy (e.g., whether
normative premises can dier between ethical machines) [29]. Also, because these works did not
provide an extensive and systematic overview of the application of their taxonomy, verication of
the taxonomy with papers from the eld was missing. A recent survey from Yu et al. [65] on ethics
in AI has some overlap with this work, but 1) does not systematically apply the ethical theory
classication to selected papers and 2) takes a broader perspective to include consequences of and
interaction with ethical AI, while this paper focuses specically on machine ethics implementations.
Hence, compared to previous works, this survey covers more related work, provides a more
extensive classication, and describes the relationship between dierent ethics approaches and
1While there are other terms for the eld, such as “Articial Morality” and “Computational Ethics”, the term “Machine





















dierent technology solutions in more depth than previous work [2, 29, 65, 147]. Furthermore, gaps
are identied in the implementation of ethics in existing systems.
is paper is created as a collaboration between ethicists and computer scientists. In the context
of implementing machine ethics, it can be a pitfall for philosophers to use a purely theoretical
approach without consulting computer scientists, as this can result in theories that are too abstract
to be implemented. Conversely, computer scientists may implement a faulty interpretation of an
ethical theory if they do not consult a philosopher. In such an interdisciplinary eld, it is crucial to
have a balanced cooperation between the dierent elds involved.
e contributions of this article are as follows:
• Based on previous work [2], a taxonomy is dened to analyze the eld based on three
dierent dimensions: types of ethical theory (Section 4), implementation of ethics (Section
5), and technological details (Section 6).
• An exhaustive selection and description of relevant contributions related to machine ethics
implementations is presented (Section 8).
• e reviewed publications are classied and research paerns and challenges are identied
(Section 7).
• A number of general lessons for the eld are discussed and further important research
directions for machine ethics are outlined (Section 9).
As such, this survey aims to provide a guide, not only to researchers but also to those interested
in the state of the art in machine ethics, as well as seed a discussion on what is preferred and
accepted in society, and how machine ethics should be implemented.
e rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the eld of machine ethics,
its importance, and justication of used terminology throughout the paper. Section 3 lists the
methodology used to create this survey, including the search methodology, the process of creating
the classication dimensions, and the actual classication process. Section 4, 5 and 6 introduce
the three classication dimensions presented in this survey. Section 7 discusses the results of the
classication of the selected papers, whereas Section 8 summarizes those papers. Finally, Section 9
outlines which future avenues of research may be interesting to pursue based on the analysis, as
well as the limitations of this survey.
2 INTRODUCTION TO MACHINE ETHICS
Before going into more depth on the implementation of ethics, it is important to establish what is
considered machines ethics, why it maers, and present the relevant terminology for the eld.
2.1 Relevance
Soware and hardware (combined under the term “machine” throughout this survey) are increas-
ingly assisting humans in various domains. ey are also tasked with many types of decisions
and activities previously performed by humans. Hence, there will be a tighter interaction between
humans and machines, leading to the risk of less meaningful human control and an increased
number of decision made by machines. As such, ethics needs to be a factor in decision making to
consider fundamental problems such as the aribution of responsibility (e.g., [122]) or what counts
as morally right or wrong in the rst place (e.g., [135]). Additionally, ethics is needed to reduce the
chance of negative results for humans and/or to mitigate the negative eects machines can cause.
Authors in the eld give dierent reasons for studying (implementations in) machine ethics.
Fears of the negative consequences of AI motivate the rst category of reasons: creating machines
that do not have a negative societal impact [12, 86]. With further autonomy and complexity, ethics
need to be implemented in a more elaborate way [24, 38, 49, 75, 95, 99]. Society needs to be able to
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rely on machines to act ethically when they gain autonomy [6, 48]. A second category of reasons
for studying machine ethics focuses on the ethics part: by implementing ethics, ethical theory will
be beer understood [24, 58, 95, 99].Robots might even outperform humans in terms of ethical
behavior at some point [4, 8].
Some authors contend that in cases with no consensus on the most ethical way to act, the machine
should not be allowed to act autonomously [5, 122]. However, not acting does not imply the moral
conundrum is avoided. In fact, the decision not to act also has a moral dimension [55, 78, 144]
—think, for example, of the dierence between active and passive euthanasia [106]. Additionally, by
not allowing the machine to act, all the possible advantages of these machines are foregone. Take,
for example, autonomous cars: a large number of trac accidents could be avoided by allowing
autonomous cars on the road. Moreover, simply not allowing certain machines would not stimulate
the conversation on how to solve the lack of consensus; a conversation that can lead to new, more
practical ethical insights and helpful machines.
2.2 Terminology
An oen-used term in the eld of machine ethics is “Articial Moral Agent” or AMA, to refer to
a machine with ethics as part of its programming. However, to see if this term is appropriate to
use, it is important to identify what ethical agents mean in the context of machine ethics and how
ethical machines should be regarded. In an oen-cited paper, Moor [95] denes four dierent levels
of ethical agents:
Ethical-impact agents are types of agents that have an (indirect) ethical impact. An example
would be a simple assembly line robot that replaces a human in a task. e robot itself does
not do anything (un)ethical by acting. However, by existing and doing its task, it has an ethical
impact on its environment; in this case, the human that performed the task is replaced and has
to nd another job.
Implicit ethical agents do not have any ethics explicitly added in their soware. ey are
considered implicitly ethical because their design involves safety or critical reliability concerns.
For example, autopilots in airplanes should let passengers arrive safely and on time.
Explicit ethical agents draw on ethical knowledge or reasoning that they use in their decision
process. ey are explicitly ethical, since normative premises can be found directly in their
programming or reasoning process.
Fully ethical agents can make explicit judgments and are able to justify these judgments. Cur-
rently, humans are the only agents considered to be full ethical agents, partially because they
have consciousness, free will, and intentionality.
While these denitions can help with a rst indication of the types of ethical machines, they do
not allow for distinctions from a technical perspective and are also unclear from a philosophical
perspective: Moor [95] does not actually dene what an (ethical) agent is. For example, it can be
debated whether an autopilot is an agent. erefore, a clearer denition is needed of what an agent
is. Himma [74] investigates the concepts of agency and moral agency, drawing from philosophical
sources such as the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
He proposes the following denitions:
Agent : “X is an agent if and only if X can instantiate intentional mental states capable of per-
forming actions.” [74, p. 21]
Moral agency : “For all X, X is a moral agent if and only if X is (1) an agent having the capacities
for (2) making free choices, (3) deliberating about what one ought to do, and (4) understanding
and applying moral rules correctly in the paradigm cases.” [74, p. 24]
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With regards to articial agents, Himma postulates that the existence of natural agents can be
explained by biological analysis, while articial agents are created by “intentional agents out of
pre-existing materials” [74, p. 24]. He emphasizes that natural and articial agents are not mutually
exclusive (e.g. a clone of a living being). He further claims that moral agents need to have conscious
and intentionality, something that state-of-the-art systems do not seem to instantiate. It is worth
noting that Himma aempts to provide a general denition of moral agency, while for example
Floridi and Sanders [54] propose to change the current description of a moral agent. For example,
they proposed description includes the separation the technical concepts of moral responsibility and
moral accountability, a distinction that was not evident thus far: “An agent is morally accountable
for x if the agent is the source of x and x is morally qualiable […] To be also morally responsible for
x, the agent needs to show the right intentional states”. Wallach and Allen [137] rate AMAs along
two dimensions: how sensitive systems are to moral considerations and how autonomous they are.
Sullins [126] has a partially overlapping concept of requirements for robotic moral agency with
Himma’s, that intersects with Wallach and Allen’s relevant concepts: autonomy (i.e. “the capacity
for self-government”) [27]), intentionality (i.e. “the directedness or ‘aboutness’ of many, if not all,
conscious states”[27]) and responsibility (i.e. “those things for which people are accountable”[27]).
ese are just some notions of how concepts such as agency, autonomy, intentionality, account-
ability and responsibility are important to the eld of machine ethics. However, it is challenging
to summarize and dene these concepts concisely while doing justice to the work in philosophy,
and computer science that has been done so far, including the discussions and controversy around
dierent relevant concepts (as the dierent concepts of moral agency display). e goal of this
survey is not to give an introduction to moral philosophy, so this section merely gives a glimpse of
the depths of the topic. Rather, the goal is to summarize and analyze the current state of the eld of
machine ethics. To avoid any assumption on concepts, the popular term Autonomous Moral Agent
is not used in this survey: as shown above, the term “agent” can be debated in this context and the
term “autonomous” has various meanings in the dierent surveyed systems. Instead, a machine
that has some form of ethical theory implemented—implicitly or explicitly—in it is referred to as an
“ethical machine” throughout this paper.
3 SURVEY METHODOLOGY
is section describes the search strategy, paper selection criteria, and review process used for this
survey.
3.1 Search Strategy
A literature review was conducted to create an overview of the dierent implementations of
and approaches to machine ethics. e search of relevant papers was conducted in two phases:
automated search and manual search.
Automated Search. e rst phase used a search entry that reected dierent terms related to
machine ethics combined with the word ‘implementation’:
implementation AND ( ”machine ethics” OR ”articial morality” OR ”machine
morality” OR ”computational ethics” OR ”roboethics” OR ”robot ethics” OR ”arti-
cial moral agents”)
ese terms were cumulated during the search process (e.g. [139, p. 455]); each added term resulted
in a new search until no new terms emerged.2 No time period of publication was specied, to
include as many items as possible.
2e term ”Friendly AI”, coined by Yampolsky [148], is excluded since it describes theoretical approaches to machine ethics.
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e following library databases were consulted (with the number of results in parenthesis): Web
of Science (18), Scopus (237), ACM Digital Library (16), Wiley Online Library (23), ScienceDirect
(48), AAAI Publications (4), Springer Link (247), and IEEE Xplore (113). Of these initial results, 37
items were selected based on the selection criteria listed in Section 3.2.
Manual Search. e second phase included checking the related work and other work by the
same rst authors of phase one. Twenty-nine promising results from phase one did not meet all
criteria, but were included in the second search phase to see if related publications did meet all
criteria. is process was repeated for each newly found paper, until no more papers could be
added that t the selection criteria (see 3.2). is resulted in a total of 49 papers, describing 48
ethical machines.
3.2 Selection Criteria
Aer the selection process, two more coauthors judged which papers should be in- or excluded to
verify the selection. Papers were included only if they adhered to all of the following inclusion
criteria. e paper
• implements a system OR describes a system in sucient (high-level) detail for implementa-
tion OR implements/describes a language to implement ethical cases,
• describes a system that is explicitly sensitive to ethical variables (as described by [95]), no
maer whether it achieves this sensitivity through top-down rule-based approaches or
boom-up data-driven approaches (as described by [2]),
• is published as a conference paper, workshop paper, journal article, book chapter, or
technical report,
• and has ethical behavior as the main focus.
e following exclusion criteria were used. e paper
• describes machine ethics in a purely theoretical fashion,
• describes a model of (human) moral decision making without an implementable model
description,
• lists results of human judgment on ethical decisions without using the data in an imple-
mentation,
• is published as a complete book, presentation slides, editorial, thesis, or has not been
published,
• describes a particular system in less detail than other available publications,
• focuses on unethical behavior to explore ethics (e.g., a lying program),
• mentions ethical considerations while implementing a machine, but does not focus on the
ethical component and does not explain it in enough detail to be the main focus,
• simulates articial agents to see how ethics emerge (e.g. by using an evolutionary algorithm
without any validation),
• and describes a general proposal of an ethical machine without mentioning implementation
related details.
Given the focus on algorithms implementing moral decision making and the limitations of space,
we will not go into further detail as regards recent interesting work on AI and moral psychology
(cf. e.g. [17, 28, 85, 118]).
3.3 Taxonomy Creation and Review Process
In order to be able to identify strengths and weaknesses of the state of the art, we created dierent
taxonomies and classied the selected papers accordingly. It was clear that both an ethical taxonomy
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(cf. Table 1) and a technological taxonomy (cf. Table 4) were necessary. All authors agreed that
there were some aspects of implementations that did not relate exclusively to either the ethical
or the technical dimension but were still important for the classication. Hence, we dened and
applied a third taxonomy (cf. Table 3) related to implementation choices. e rst version of these
three taxonomies was created using knowledge obtained during the paper selection.
Before the classication process started, one third of the papers were randomly selected to review
the applicability of the taxonomy proposed and adjust the assessment scheme where required. Any
parts of the taxonomies that was unclear and led to inconsistent classications was adapted and
claried.
Each selected paper was categorized according to the features of the three dierent taxonomies
(discussed in Sections 4–6). Since the ethical classication is perhaps the most disputable, it was
determined by three distinct assessors: two philosophers and a computer scientist. Two computer
scientists evaluated the implementation and technical details of all proposed systems.
To provide a classication for all selected papers, multiple classication rounds took place for
each dimension. In between classication rounds, disagreements across reviewers were discussed
until a consensus was reached. In the case of the ethical dimensions, four papers could not be
agreed upon aer multiple classication rounds. As such, these papers were labeled as ’Ambiguous’.
4 ETHICAL THEORIES
is section introduces the rst of three taxonomies introduced in this paper: a taxonomy of types
of ethical theories, which is the basis for the categorization of ethical frameworks used by machines
(in Section 7). Note that this section is not a general introduction to (meta-)ethics, which can for
example be found in [26, 41, 94].
4.1 Overview of Ethical Theory Types
It is commonplace to dierentiate between three distinct overarching approaches to ethics: con-
sequentialism, deontological ethics, and virtue ethics. Consequentialists dene an action as
morally good if it maximizes well-being or utility. Deontologists dene an action as morally good
if it is in line with certain applicable moral rules or duties. Virtue ethicists dene an action as
morally good if, in acting in a particular way, the agent manifests moral virtues. Consider an
example: an elderly gentleman is harassed by a group of cocky teenagers on the subway and a
resolute woman comes to his aid. e consequentialist will explain her action as good since the
woman maximized the overall well-being of all parties involved—the elderly gentleman is spared
pain and humiliation which outweighs the teenagers’ amusement. e deontologist will consider
her action commendable as it is in accordance with the rule (or duty) to help those in distress. e
virtue ethicist, instead, will deem her action morally appropriate since it instantiates the virtues of
benevolence and courage.
Consequentialist theories can be divided into two main schools: according to act utilitarianism,
the principle of utility (maximize overall well-being) must be applied to each individual act. Rule
utilitarians, by contrast, advocate the adoption of those and only those moral rules that will
maximize well-being. Cases can thus arise where an individual action does not itself maximize
well-being, yet is consistent with an overarching well-being maximizing rule. While act utilitarians
would consider this action morally bad, rule utilitarians would consider it good.
Deontological ethics can be divided into agent-centered and patient-centered approaches. Agent-
centred theories focus on agent-relative duties, such as, for instance, the kinds of duties someone
has towards their parents (rather than parents in general). eories of this sort contrast with
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patient-centered theories that focus on the rights of patients (or potential victims), such as the right,
postulated by Kant, not to be used as a means to an end by someone else [81].
Finally, there are some approaches that question the universal applicability of general ethical
principles to all situations, as put forward by deontological ethics, virtue ethics or consequentialism.
For such a particularist view, moral rules or maxims are simply vague rules of thumb, which
cannot do justice to the complexity of the myriad of real-life situations in which moral agents
might nd themselves. Hence, they have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
We would like to highlight that a moral theory is a set of substantial moral principles that deter-
mine what, according to the theory, is morally right and wrong. Moral theories can take dierent
structures —they might state their concrete demands in terms of hard rules (deontological ethics);
virtues that should guide actions, with reference to an overall principle of utility maximization, or
else reject the proposal that there is a one-size-ts-all solution (itself a structural trait, this would
be particularism). In this work, we are interested in these structures, which we label “ethical theory
types”.
4.2 Categorizing Ethical Machines by Ethical Theory Type
Based on the distinct types of ethical theories introduced above, this sub-section develops a simple
taxonomy for categorizing ethical machines, summarized in Table 1.












An evaluation of existing approaches to moral decision making
in machines can make use of this typology in the following way.
Deontological ethics is rule-based. What maers is that the agent
acts in accordance with established moral rules and/or does not vi-
olate the rights of others (whose protection is codied by specied
rules). Accidents occur, and a well-disposed agent might nonethe-
less bring about a harmful outcome. On o-the-shelf deontological
views, bad outcomes (if non-negligently, or at least unintention-
ally, brought about) play no role in moral evaluation, whereas the
agent’s mental states (their intentions, , and beliefs) are important.
If John, intending to deceive Sally about the shortest way to work,
tells the truth (perhaps because he himself is poorly informed), a
Kantian will consider his action morally wrong, despite its positive
consequence.3 In the context of machine ethics, the focus is solely
on agent relative duties. Hence, no distinction is made between
agent-centered and patient-centered theories of deontological ethics in the taxonomy summarized
in Table 1.
Consequentialists, by contrast, largely disregard the agent’s mental states and focus principally
on outcomes: what maers is the maximization of overall well-being. Note that, procedurally,
a rule-utilitarian system can appear very similar to a deontological one. e agent must act in
keeping with a set of rules (potentially the very same as in a Kantian system) which, in the long
run, maximizes well-being. However, the two types of systems can still be distinguished in terms
of the ultimate source of normativity (well-being vs. good will) and will—standardly—dier in
terms of the importance accorded to the agent’s mental states. us far, nearly all consequentialist
machine ethics implementations utilize act utilitarianism. For this reason, the distinction between
act and rule utilitarianism is not relevant enough to be included in this survey.
Virtue ethics diers from the aforementioned systems in so far as it does not focus principally on
(the consequences or rule-consistency of) actions but on agents, and more particularly on whether
3Note that if two actions dier only with respect to outcome, consequences can play a role.
7
Table 2. High-level overview to ethics categories in the context of ethical machine implementation
Input Decision criteria Mechanism Challenges (examples)
Deontological ethics
Action (mental states Rules/duties Fiingness with rule • Conicting rules
and consequences) • Imprecise rules
Consequentialism Action (consequences) Comparative well-being Maximization of utility • Aggregation problems
• Determining utility
Virtue ethics Properties of agent Virtues Instantiation of virtue(s) • Conicting virtues




Rules of thumb, precedent,
all situations are unique
Fiingness with
rules/precedent
• No unique and universal logic
• Each situation needs unique
assessment
they exhibit good moral character or virtuous dispositions. A good action is one that is consistent
with the kinds of moral dispositions a virtuous person would have.
In contrast to the other three major approaches, on the particularist view, there is no unique source
of normative value, nor is there a single, universally applicable procedure for moral assessment.
Rules or precedents can guide our evaluative practices. However, they are deemed too crude to do
justice to many individual situations. us, according to particularism, whether a certain feature is
morally relevant or not in a new situation —and if so, what exact role it is playing there— will be
sensitive to other features of the situation.
Table 2 gives a schematic overview of key characteristics of the dierent types of ethical systems
that might be implemented in an ethical machine. Note that it does not take some of the more
ne-grained aspects dierentiating the theories (e.g., the before-mentioned complications regarding
act and rule utilitarianism) into account.
As an alternative to implementing a single determinate type of ethics, systems can also combine
two or more types, resulting in a hybrid ethical machine. is approach seems enticing when one
theory alleviates problems another one might have in certain situations, but it can also generate
conicts across types of ethical approaches. Hence, some proposals enforce a specied hierarchy,
which means that one theory is dominant over the other(s) in the system. For example, a primarily
deontological system might use rules, but turn to the utilitarian approach of maximizing utility
when the rules are in conict. In other cases, the hierarchy is non-specic and dierent theories are
present without a specied dominant theory.
Some authors do not sele on a particular type of ethical theory. Instead, they provide a
congurable technical framework or language and exhibit how dierent types of ethical theories
can be implemented. e choice of which theory type should be selected is essentially le to the
person implementing the system in an actual use case.
Finally, some contributions were classied as ambiguous from a meta-ethical perspective. For
these, not enough details were given by the authors to classify a paper, or the theories used to
implement were not ethical theories but retrieved from domains other than moral philosophy.
e next section introduces the second dimension of ethical machines: implementing ethics into
a machine.
5 IMPLEMENTING ETHICS
e second taxonomy that was created for this survey considers the implementation aspect of
machine ethics. An important part of creating an ethical system is to decide how to implement ethics.
at entails dening whether an implementation can follow dierent approaches, how to evaluate
the system, and whether or not domain specications need to be taken into account. Important
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features concerning the implementation dimension are summarized in Table 3. Furthermore, this
section highlights the implementation challenges that the various ethical theories entail.
5.1 Approaches
Dierent taxonomies have been proposed to determine how ethics types are implemented. e
most inuential and widely referenced scheme, also applied in this survey, stems from Allen, Smit
and Wallach [2]. ey distinguish three types of implementation approaches, namely top-down,
boom-up, and hybrid.
Top-down approaches : Top-down approaches assume that humans have gathered sucient
knowledge on a specic topic; it is a maer of translating this knowledge into an implementation.
e ethical theory types described in Section 4 are examples of normative human knowledge
that can be translated into usable mechanisms for machines. e system acts in line with
predetermined guidelines and its behavior is therefore predictable. In AI, strategies using
a top-down approach mostly make use of logical or case-based reasoning. Given general
domain knowledge, the system can reason about the situation that is given as input. Usually,
human knowledge is not specied in a very structured or detailed way for concrete cases, so
knowledge needs to be interpreted before it can be used. is process presents the risk of losing
or misrepresenting information. e positive aspect of this approach is that existing knowledge
is applied and no new knowledge needs to be generated.
Bottom-up approaches : A dierent method to implementing ethics is to assume the machine
can learn how to act if it receives as input enough correctly labeled data to learn from. is
approach, not just in machine ethics but in general, has gained popularity aer the surge
of machine learning in AI and the recent success of neural networks. Technologies such as
articial neural networks, reinforcement learning, and evolutionary computing fall under this
trend. Increased computing power and amounts of data allow learning systems to become more
successful. However, data has to be labeled consistently and the right data properties need to
be described in a machine-processable way to obtain an accurate training of machines. ere
is a risk that the machine learns the wrong rules or cannot reliably extrapolate to cases that
were not reected in its training data. However, for certain tasks, such as feature selection or
classication, machine learning can be very successful.
Hybrid approaches : As the term suggests, hybrid approaches combine top-down and boom-up
approaches. As Allen et al. phrase it: “Both top-down and boom-up approaches embody
dierent aspects of what we commonly consider a sophisticated moral sensibility.” [2, p 153]
ey indicate that a hybrid approach is considered necessary, if a single approach does not
cover all requirements of machine ethics. e challenge consists in appropriately combining
features of top-down and boom-up approaches.
Bonnemains et al. [29] suggest adding a fourth category, called “Personal values/ethics system”.
Essentially, it acknowledges that two dierent agents may rely on dierent ethical systems or may
rely on dierent precedence in case of conicts in a hybrid system. In this survey, this is regarded
as diversity consideration: the authors of a machine ethics paper consider the possibility that
not all ethical machines adhere to the same ethical theory type, and their contribution includes the
choice of diverse types of ethics to be implemented. As Bonnemains et al. recognize, this category
is somewhat orthogonal to the previous three, as all of those can be seen to implement distinct
normative principles. For example, a machine ethics implementation with diversity consideration
could allow for multiple ethical theory types to be implemented (i.e., a top-down approach) or
allow for dierent machines to learn dierent types of ethics (i.e., a boom-up approach). It is
considered part of the implementation dimension rather than the ethics dimension since diversity
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considerations can also exist within the same ethical theory, for example, by allowing deontological
machines to have dierent rules to adhere to while still all being deontological in nature. is
survey regards structures of normative frameworks and their implementation rather than substantial
normative principles (c.f. Table 3).
5.2 Type of Contribution
Ethical systems can be intended to enact dierent aspects of ethical behavior. is section discusses
the dierent types of contributions published to implement ethical machines.
Model representation : is contribution type focuses on representing current ethical knowledge.
e goal is to determine how to appropriately represent a theory, dilemma, or expert-generated
guidelines whilst staying true to the original theory.
Model selection : Given a set of alternative options to implement an ethical machine, some
systems limit their action to selecting the most ing elements to be included in the system.
Judgment provision : ese contributions focus on judging an action given a scenario and a set
of possible actions. Example outputs are binary (acceptable/non-acceptable) or responses on a
scale (e.g., very ethical to very unethical).
Action selection/execution : Here the proposed system chooses which action is best given
multiple possible actions for a scenario. Some systems then assign the action to a human, while
others carry out the selected action themselves. Part of the action selection task can also be
action restriction, when some possible actions are not morally acceptable (enough).
5.3 Evaluation
Most artifacts—simple or complex, concrete or abstract—can be evaluated in virtue of their capacity
to fulll their constitutive function or purpose. A good knife cuts well, a good thermostat reliably
activates the heating if the temperature drops below a predetermined threshold, and a good
translation system adequately and idiomatically converts grammatical sentences from one language
into another. Whereas there are objective and measurable criteria for the evaluation of thermostats,
things are more cumbersome when it comes to moral machines. is is not because their purpose
does not standardly consist in simply “acting morally”, but in executing certain tasks (taking care
of the elderly, counselling suicidal people, evaluating risk of recidivism etc.) in a moral fashion.
Much rather, the complication arises from the question of what exactly is to count as executing
the task at hand in morally appropriate ways, or against what exactly the behavior of the system
should be evaluated.
ere are objective facts as to whether an image represents a certain type of animal or not.
ese facts constrain whether the image is correctly classied as representing an animal. e
existence of objective, universal moral values, by contrast, is controversial (cf. e.g., [72, 88, 105, 133]).
Furthermore, and as objectivists readily acknowledge, delineating what is morally permissible
poses an epistemic challenge of a dierent order than identifying, say, a girae in an image, or
determining the weight of an object. e ontological and epistemic complications that arise in
the moral domain thus make it dicult to sele on standards against which the performance of
a moral machine could be evaluated. More fundamentally, it is not even evident what kinds of
considerations should guide the process of choosing such standards.
While complications as to the evaluation of a moral machine are worrying, their practical
signicance should not be exaggerated. Although there is disagreement as regards complex cases,
in ordinary life situations in which one is confronted with extremely dicult ethical decisions or
run away trolleys are exceedingly rare. In many domains, moral dilemmas are unlikely to arise or
be of much import, and there is widespread convergence (not only among the folk, but experts,
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too) on what constitutes adequate moral behavior. Overall, then, the challenge of evaluation might
raise metaphysical and epistemic complications of limited pragmatic importance, at least when
care is exercised to limit the decision capacity of moral machines to mundane contexts that steer
clear of complex ethical paradoxes.
5.3.1 Test. When a system is tested, the system outcome needs to be compared against a ground
truth. ese may have the following origins:
Non-experts : One possibility consists in making folk morality the benchmark. Problematically,
there is substantial evidence of moral parochialism across cultures (e.g., [53, 87, 113]), and it is
not dicult to nd topics on which a single nation is roughly divided —just think of abortion,
euthanasia, or same-sex relations in the US [112]. Furthermore, the existence of widespread
convergence in moral opinion does not necessarily make such opinions true or acceptable
(consider that until a century and a half ago, there was broad agreement in considerable parts
of the world that slavery is morally acceptable).
Experts : To escape the tyranny of a potentially mistaken or self-serving majority, one might
adopt the standard of experts in normative ethics. Problematically, however, experts themselves
are sometimes deeply divided on fundamental issues of moral import as well as meta-ethical
intuitions [31] and their very expertise can be called into question [119, 120].
Laws : One might side-step the complications raised by retreating to a second-best solution: the
law. is strategy, however, is not without drawbacks either, as the law is simply silent on most
questions of day-to-day morality. It is, for instance, not illegal to lie in most contexts, yet it
would be regarded as outrageous to be perpetually deceived by “moral” machines. Still, it might
be suitable to draw on the law to provide restrictions where they exist, for example, as concerns
the “Laws of War” or “Laws of Armed Conicts” for the lethal weapons domain [8], or specic
domain rules such as the Code of Ethics for Engineers [91]. As Arkin [8] suggests, scoping
the problem using domain-specic requirements can make it more easily implementable and
testable.
5.3.2 Prove. Another approach, typically based on some type of logic, consists of proving that
the system behaves correctly according to some known specications. is approach can be divided
into the following types:
Model checker : Given an ethical machine, a model checker exhaustively and automatically
ascertains that it adheres to a given set of specications.
Logical proof : is approach provides a logical proof that given certain premises, the system
does what it should do. Proofs of this sort can be eected manually, or by using a theorem
prover which employs automated logical and mathematical reasoning.
Note that this approach assumes that a correct specication exists a priori and is widely accepted.
Within the logic community, model checking and theorem proving are oen considered an imple-
mentation issue rather than a type of evaluation (e.g., see [68]). In some cases, authors do not even
explicitly mention that they employ a model checker, because it is inherent in their approach to
logic programming. However, given the multidisciplinary nature of the eld of machine ethics, it is
vital to explicitly state which approach has been used. Furthermore, while logical/internal validity
and consistency may be inherent in the system, a form of evaluation is necessary to ensure the
system acts as expected in dierent cases and exhibits external validity.
5.3.3 Informal evaluation. Some authors refrain from formally evaluating their implementation.
Instead, they only describe their work and, in some cases, show a few example scenarios or exhibit
application domains. Whilst these approaches may have limited validity, they may be warranted
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given the evaluation complications outlined above or when the authors principally engage in theory
building [50].
Example scenarios/case studies : To showcase that the system works as intended, one or mul-
tiple scenarios are presented to demonstrate the system’s performance. is procedure gives
a rst indication of the functionalities of the machine or may help in theorizing about cer-
tain properties of a system, but it does not cover all possible situations or give a complete
performance indication.
Face validity : Oen described as “reasonable results”, authors using this approach state that the
results of a few example tasks are as expected. It is oen unclear what this means and to what
extent these results are desirable.
5.3.4 None. When no evaluation could be discerned, papers were categorized as having none of
the evaluation types present.
5.4 Domain Specificity
What is deemed an appropriate action can depend on the domain in which the ethical agent is
operating, such as the principles in the domain of biomedical ethics as proposed by Beauchamps
and Childress [21] for the medical domain, or the Rules of Engagement and Laws of Armed Conict
for autonomous weapon systems [8]. Hence, some contributions focus on a specic application
domain, which limits the scope of an ethical machine implementation, and thus the endeavor is
more manageable [8].





























ere are certain challenges inherent in the dierent types of ethics when they are being imple-
mented. Since these obstacles need to be taken into account to select an ethical theory type for an
ethical machine, this subsection provides a (non-exhaustive) list of complications.
Challenges when implementing deontological ethics: At a rst glance, the rule-based nature of
deontological ethics seems to lend itself well for implementation. However, at dierent stages
of implementation, challenges arise. e rst issue is which rules should be implemented. Rules
are expected to be strictly followed, implying that for every exception, the rule must be amended,
resulting in an extremely long rule. Determining the right level of detail is important for the
success of an application: when the rules are not practical and at the right level of detail, they will
not be interpretable for the machine [8]. Second, there might be conicts between rules [29]—in
general or in specic situations. Whilst ordering or weighing the rules might address this issue
from an implementational perspective, determining an order of importance can be dicult. Also,
this assumes that all relevant rules are determined before they are used.
Challenges when implementing consequentialist ethics: ere are three main categories of dicul-
ties for consequentialist ethics. First, it is hard to identify consequences and determine the right level
of detail and aggregation in terms of time and size. Some outcomes might have resulted regardless
of the action theorized to have caused it. In real-life situations, all possible consequences are not
always that clear beforehand given the lack of epistemic transparency and causal interdependence.
A second issue is concerned with quantifying consequences. As consequentialism is about
maximizing utility, the problem is how to dene utility. In simple scenarios like the Trolley problem,
utility is oen dened as how many people survive or die. In the real world, more complex concepts,
such as happiness and well-being, are preferred to dene utility. ere are measures available (e.g.,
QALY [64]), but using a dierent measure can give a dierent outcome. Even more so, even if each
consequence is assigned a utility, it might still be inappropriate to simply aggregate them (e.g., see
[83]).
Finally, there might be a signicant computational cost when computing utility [141] requiring
heuristics or approximations to derive a correct answer in time. is, in turn, requires a verication
of whether these results are still correct.
Challenges when implementing virtue ethics: Virtues are positive character traits, character traits
that should be manifested in morally good actions. Dening what “character” a machine has is
troubling, if a machine can be claimed to have a character at all. To judge whether a machine—or a
human for that maer—is virtuous is not possible by merely observing one action or a series of
actions that seem to imply that virtue; the reasons behind them need to be clear [123]. Perhaps
the best way to create a virtuous machine is to let a machine mimic the behavior of a virtuous
person. But how is a certain virtue measured, and who decides which virtues are more important
and how to pick the perfect role model? Coleman [39] even proposes dierent virtues that are
more desirable for machines rather than human virtues, implying merely mimicking a virtuous
person is not sucient.
To circumvent these challenges, machine ethics researchers have not used virtue ethics oen,
as the alternatives might be more appealing. For example, Haber [66] states that virtue ethics
and principle-based ethics are complements and that for each trait there will be a principle that
expresses that trait and vice versa. While not everyone agrees with Haber, it is easier and more
detailed from a computational perspective to implement rules than generic virtues to adhere to.
Arkin [8] also concludes that principle-based and act-centric models allow for stricter ethical
implementations, which is desirable in machine ethics.
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Challenges when implementing particularism: In particularism, the system needs to take the
entire context into account. is implies that it needs to either be trained for all possible cases,
which is not possible, or be able to extrapolate without using generalizations, which is highly
challenging. For each feature of the context, the system would have to recognize whether it is
morally relevant in the given case and how it will inuence the result. Case-based methods or
instance-based classications come closest to allowing an implementation of particularism. More
recently, some contributions are trying to approximate particularist ethics using neural networks
(e.g., [62, 71]).
Challenges when implementing hybrid approaches: Each type of ethical theory raises its own
set of complications, but combining them introduces additional issues. First, when dierent
types of ethical theories are used in a non-hierarchical way, the interaction between them can be
problematic: how should the results from dierent ethical approaches be combined to guarantee
morally appropriate outcomes? What happens when the results of dierent implemented ethical
theory types stand in conict, and how should such conicts be resolved?
Second, when a hierarchical approach is employed, it is not evident when the system should
employ one theory rather than another. One standard approach resorts to the secondary set
of ethical principles when the rst does not deliver a verdict. While this alleviates some of the
challenges of hybrid systems, it is still possible that the second ethical theory proposes something
that conicts with the rst ethical theory type.
6 TECHNICAL DIMENSION
e third and nal taxonomy introduced regards the technical dimension of machine ethics. is
includes the type of technology chosen for the implementation, the input the system relies on, the
ethical machine’s availability (i.e., implementation details are published) and some implementation
features: whether it relies on specic hardware or feedback from users, provides explanations
for its conclusions, has a user interface (UI), and whether the input for the system needs to be
preprocessed. Important features pertaining to the technical dimension are surveyed in Table 4.
6.1 Types of Technology
Inspired by Russell and Norvig [110], dierent types of technologies can be distinguished. While
these types of technology are not always clearly delimited, this categorization allows comparing
implementations.
6.1.1 Logical reasoning. ere are dierent types of logic or logic-based techniques used in
machine ethics.
Deductive logic : is is the classical type of logic: knowledge is represented as logical statements—
propositions and rules—that allow deriving new propositions. Pure deductive systems typically
involve no learning or inference involved but only derive what can be known from their set of
statements and inputs.
Non-monotonic logic : Non-monotonic logic allows the revision of conclusions when a conict
arises, for example, in light of new information.
Abductive logic : In abductive logic, the conclusions drawn are the most likely propositions given
the premises.
Deontic logic : is type of logic stems from philosophy and is specically designed to express
normative propositions. Naturally, this type of logic is inherently suited for the representation
and deduction of moral propositions.
14
Rule-based systems : As the name suggests, rule-based systems are systems that function based
on a set of rules. ese can be ethical rules the system has to adhere to. Note that many of the
dierent types of logic above are typically implemented as some form of rule-based system.
Event calculus : Event calculus allows reasoning about events. When a machine needs to act
ethically, dierent events can trigger dierent types of behavior.
Knowledge representation (KR) and ontologies : A KR approach focuses on representing
knowledge in a form that a computer system can utilize. In other words, the emphasis lies on
improving the quality of the data rather than (just) improving the algorithm.
Inductive logic : When relying on inductive logic, premises are induced or learned from examples,
rather than pre-dened by a human.
6.1.2 Probabilistic reasoning. Recently, probabilistic reasoning has gained more aention. Dif-
ferent types of probabilistic reasoning approaches can be distinguished.
Bayesian approaches Based on Bayes’ rule, these approaches rely on prior knowledge to compute
the likelihood of an event. In an ethical context, a machine can then act based on this predicted
information.
Markov models Markov models focus on sequences of randomly changing events, assuming that
a future event only depends on the current (and not the previous) event(s).
Statistical inference By retrieving probability distributions from available data, the system can
try to predict the chances of future events happening.
6.1.3 Learning. e increased computational power, the amounts of data available, and the
GPU-driven revival of neural networks have made learning systems more popular. ere are
dierent learning approaches to be characterized.
Inductive logic : In inductive logic, a rule-base for reasoning is learned. As such, it is listed under
both the “Logic” and “Learning” categories of this taxonomy.
Decision tree : Decision trees are a supervised learning method to solve a classication problem
by exploring the decision space as a search tree and computing the expected utility. ey are,
thus, useful to identify and interpret the features that are most important to classify cases.
Reinforcement learning : A system can learn from its actions when they are reinforced with
rewards or punishments received from its environment.
Neural networks : A neural network can be trained on many cases, to be able to classify new
cases based on their relevant features.
Evolutionary computing : Evolutionary algorithms are used when, for example, dierent com-
peting models of an ethical machine exist. Models evolve in an iterative fashion, based on actions
inspired from the concept of evolution in the eld of biology (e.g., selection, and mutation) [79]
6.1.4 Optimization. e most common form of optimization relies on a closed-form formula for
which some optimal parameters are sought. Dierent actions get assigned dierent values based
on a predetermined formula, and the best value is chosen (e.g., the highest value).
6.1.5 Case-based reasoning. In case-based reasoning, a new situation is assessed based on a
collection of prior cases. Similar cases are identied and their conclusions are transferred to apply
to the current situation.
6.2 Input
To be able to respond appropriately, ethical machines need to receive information about the
environment (or situation at hand). Input is the information that the system receives, not the
transformation the system itself performs on the data aerwards.
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Sensor data : In the case of (simulated) hardware, the machine perceives the input through its
sensors. e sensor data is interpreted and processed to serve as the input.
Case: Logical representation : Systems using a form of logic oen need an input case repre-
sented using logic.
Case: Numerical representation : Other systems, for example ones using neural nets, need
their input in a numerical form. is can be a vector representation or a set of numbers.
Case: Language representation : Language inputs can be natural language or input translated
into structured language.
6.3 Implementation availability
As mentioned before, part of the eld of machine ethics tends to be of a theoretical nature. is
becomes apparent in the level of detail of implementation proposals. While some authors implement
an idea and provide the source code, this is fairly rare in machine ethics. Some authors only give a
few implementation details, and others merely specify a high-level description of their idea. Usually,
the focus lies on sketching an idea rather than its complete implementation.
Specication details : is level has the fewest implementation details: the author species the
proposed idea (e.g., textually) without any additional detail.
Implementation details : is next level provides implementation details illustrating how the
specication is implemented in the described machine.
Code (link) provided : is nal level provides the link to the code of the machine, so the
prototype can be used and the experiments can be replicated.
6.4 Other Implementation Categories
is section introduces dierent and independent categories that are of interest for the implemen-
tation of an ethical machine.
6.4.1 Hardware. Robots can have direct physical results rather than “just” digital or indirect
physical consequences. Hardware can change the way people interact with a system and how it
should be able to function, making it an interesting and important feature to classify.
6.4.2 Feedback. No maer which ethical approach is used, feedback is a valuable component of
an ethical system. For example, the user can be asked whether the provided output was the best
given the input or whether the system was clear during its decision process.
6.4.3 Explanation. Transparency is important when it comes to algorithmic decisions, both
from a user perspective [149] and, in some cases (such as the General Data Protection Regulation
in the European Union [60]), from a legal perspective. To achieve this goal, an understandable
explanation should be provided by the system.
6.4.4 User Interface (UI). Systems should be easy to interact with. is is important for all
machines, including ethical machines.
6.4.5 Automated processing. Sometimes, initial prototypes focus on the concept of a system,
not the (detailed) implementation, and may require some pre-processing of the input data. Ideally,
systems should be able to process input from the environment automatically.
16
Table 4. Technical taxonomy. As explained in Section 6, “Inductive logic” is present twice.






























Specication details Y - P - N (Yes - Partially - No)
Implementation details Y - P - N
Code (link) provided Y - P - N
Other
Hardware (simulation) Y - P - N
Feedback Y - P - N
Explanation Y - P - N
UI(mostly GUI) Y - P - N
Automated processing Y - P - N
7 ANALYSIS
e goal of this section is to classify the surveyed moral machines according to the taxonomies
introduced in Sections 4–6 and elicit paerns in the literature based on this classication. Specif-
ically, every publication is categorized according to the ethics, implementation, and technology
taxonomies (as described in Section 3).
7.1 Ethical Classification
e classication results for the ethical dimension of machine ethics implementations can be found
in Table 5; the ratio of single vs. hybrid theory papers is visualized in Figure 1. Among the papers,
several constitute clear-cut cases instantiating one of the four main ethical systems. For example,
[5, 97, 121] are clearly deontological; and [1, 37, 49, 132] constitute uncontroversial examples of
consequentialist systems. Furthermore, a considerable number of papers invoke elements from
multiple systems. Finally, there are papers in which the hierarchy across theory types remains
ambiguous. Examples of ambiguous papers are implementations where authors try to mimic the
human brain [34], or focus on implementing constraints such as the Pareto principle [86], which
does not strictly speaking constitute a moral theory. Note that categorizing a paper as “ambiguous”
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does not imply a negative assessment of the implementation. It simply means that the proposal
cannot be adequately placed within our classication framework.
Table 5. Ethical theory classification. Hybrid dominance D-C implies both D and C are implemented, but D is
dominant. The reverse is true for Hybrid dominance C-D. For the Hybrid undefined dominance the theories
that are combined are noted in parentheses following the citation.
Ethical theory type Papers
Deontological (D)
Anderson et al. 2004 (W.D.) [6], Anderson et al. 2006 [7], Anderson et al. 2008 [3],
Anderson et al. 2014 [5], Bringsjord et al. 2012 [32], Dennis et al. 2016 [48], Malle et al. 2017 [90],
McLaren 2003 [91], Mermet et al. 2016 [92], Neto et al. 2011 [97], Noothigau et al. 2018 [98]
Reed et al. 2016 [108], Shim et al. 2017 [121], Turilli 2007 [129], Wiegel et al. 2009 [141]
Consequentialist (C)
Abel et al. 2016 [1], Anderson et al. 2004 (Jeremy) [6], Armstrong 2015 [13],
Cloos 2005 [37], Dennis et al. 2015 [49], Dang et al. 2017 [130], Vanderselst et al. 2018 [132],
Wineld et al. 2014 [142], Atkinson et al. 2008 [16]
Particularism (P) Ashley et al. 1994 [14], Guarini 2006 [62]
Hybrid dominance D-C Arkin 2007 [8], Azad-Manjiri 2014 [18], Dehghani et al. 2008 [47], Govindarajulu et al. 2017 [61],Pereira et al. 2007 [99], Tus et al. 2015 [128]
Hybrid dominance C-D Pontier et al. 2012 [104]
Hybrid undened
dominance
Lindner et al. 2017 [86] (C & A), Yilmaz et al. 2017 [147] (D, C & A), Honarvar et al. 2009 [75] (C & P),
Howard et al. 2017 [79] (P & Virtue ethics), Berreby et al. 2017 [25] (D & C)
Congurable ethics Bonnemains et al. 2018 [29], Cointe et al. 2016 [38], Ganascia 2007 [58], ornton et al. 2017 [127]
Ambiguous (A) Han et al. 2012 [69], Cervantes et al. 2016 [35], Madl et al. 2015 [89], Verheij et al. 2016 [134],
Wallach et al. 2010 [139], Wu et al. 2017 [146], Arkoudas et al. 2005 [12], Furbach et al. 2014 [57]
About 50% of the proposals draw on a single type of ethical theory (see Figure 1). As can be
seen in Table 5, deontological and consequentialist ethics are used most oen. It stands out that
particularism is barely used and pure virtue ethics is not used at all. is may be explained as
follows: rst, a generalist approach is much easier to implement than a particularist approach, as it
is more straightforward to encode generalist rules than to build systems that may have to handle as
of yet unknown, particular cases. Second, virtue ethics can be considered a very high-level theory
focusing on characteristics rather than actions or consequences, which is dicult to interpret in an
application context.
Fig. 1. Ethical theory type ratio
About a quarter of the approaches are of a hybrid nature, combining at least two classical ethical
theory types. Approximately half of those have a hierarchical approach, in which deontological
features are standardly dominant over consequentialist ones. e non-hierarchical systems, where
at least two ethical theory types work together without a single one being dominant, frequently
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(a) Ethical implementation approach (b) Domain specific
(c) Contribution type (d) Evaluation
Fig. 2. Implementation analysis
go beyond the two main types of theory. Examples are virtue ethics and particularism [79], and a
reective equilibrium approach that combines consequences, rules, and other inuences [147].
A lile less than 10% of the papers do not have a specic theory implemented. Instead, they
provide various proposals on how to implement dierent ethical theory types without choosing a
particular one. is can be considered a computer scientist approach, where the goal is to devise a
general framework which the users can adapt to their preferences.
It is surprising that despite previous calls that a single classical theory is not enough to create an
ethical machine and hybrid methods are needed (e.g., [2]), there is relatively lile work on hybrid
ethical machines. While most hybrid systems have emerged over the last ten to een year, we
could not nd evidence for an increase in the creation of such systems.
7.2 Implementation Classification
Table 6 provides an overview of the classication of the implementation dimension.
Approximately consistent with the number of single theory and hybrid theory approaches
identied in Section 8.1, most authors choose a top-down approach. Hybrid approaches account
for a lile less than 25% of those chosen (see Figure 2a).
Most authors use a general approach to machine ethics: almost three out of four do not use a
domain-specic approach, but focus on a general proposal of implementing machine ethics (see
Figure 2b).
In terms of contribution type, there is a relatively balanced division between authors investigating
how an ethical machine should be shaped (model selection and model representation) and authors
focusing on the output of the ethical machine (action judgment and action selection/execution, see
Figure 2c). Most papers address action selection/execution. About 15% of all the papers focus on
action judgment: the system judges a situation but leaves it up to the human to actually act on
this. From a broader scientic perspective, it is good that both model shaping and output-oriented
contributions are investigated. However, it would be ideal to have both things connected.
A possibility for future improvement regards system evaluation: over half of the authors either
provide no or only an informal evaluation of their system. Of the rest, about 50% use a test approach
and 50% validate their claims with some form of formal proof (see Figure 2d).
Finally, about half of the selected papers (51%) acknowledge diversity in implementable ethics,
while the other half presents work allowing for or assuming only one ethical theory type.
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Table 6. Ethical implementation classification. Diversity consideration: 3 implies yes, an empty cell implies
no/not present.








Model checker 3 Ganascia 2007 [58]
Logical proof
Arkoudas et al. 2005 [12]
Bringsjord et al. 2012 [32]
Govindarajulu et al. 2017 [61]
Informal Example scenario(s) Berreby et al. 2017 [25]
Face validity 3 Atkinson et al. 2008 [16]
None None 3 Bonnemains et al. 2018 [29]
Model selection Informal Example scenario(s)
3 Turilli 2007 [129]
3 Verheij et al. 2016 [134]




3 Medical Pontier et al. 2012 [104]
engineering McLaren 2003 [91]
Ashley et al. 1994 [14]
Expert + Non-expert Military Reed et al. 2016 [108]
Proof Model checker Dennis et al. 2015 [49]
Logical proof 3 Mermet et al. 2016 [92]




Non-expert Medical Shim et al. 2017 [121]
Dehghani et al. 2008 [47]
Laws
3 Cars ornton et al. 2016 [127]
Vanderelst et al. 2018 [132]
Wineld et al. 2014 [142]
Informal
Example scenario(s)
3 Cervantes et al. 2016 [35]
Medical Anderson et al. 2008 [3]
Cointe et al. 2016 [38]
Face validity 3 Pereira et al. 2007 [99]
None None
3 Neto et al. 2011 [97]
Home care Cloos 2005 [37]
Home care Dang et al. 2017 [130]
Anderson et al. 2004 (Jeremy) [6]







Model representation Proof Logical proof 3 Armstrong 2015 [13]
3 Furbach et al. 2014 [57]
Model selection None None 3 Howard et al. 2017 [79]
3 Malle et al. 2017 [90]
Action selection/
execution
Test Non-expert 3 Wu et al. 2017 [146]
Informal Example scenario(s) Abel et al. 2016 [1]






Test Non-expert Guarini 2006 [62]
Expert Anderson et al. 2014 [5]
None None Medical Azad-Manjiri 2014 [18]




Non-expert Honarvar et al. 2009 [75]
Expert Medical Anderson et al. 2006 [7]
Laws 3 Medical Madl et al. 2015 [89]
Informal
Example scenarios 3 Yilmaz et al. 2017 [147]
Military Arkin 2007 [8]
Face validity Han et al. 2012 [69]
None None 3 Anderson et al. 2004 (WD) [6]
3 Wallach et al. 2010 [139]
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(a) Technology type (b) Provided implementation details
Fig. 3. Technology analysis
7.3 Technical Classification
e implementation classication can be found in Table 7. Of the dierent techniques, logical
reasoning is the most frequent. Figure 3a shows the distribution of types of technology used. About
a quarter of the papers adopt more than one technology type. Only about 10% of the authors
focused on a pure learning approach. Case-based reasoning and probabilistic reasoning are the
least popular. Mostly classical AI approaches are used—perhaps due to the direct correspondence
of rules with deontological ethics.
e level of implementation detail provided is somewhat limited (see Figure 3b): although
most authors include a specication of their idea in the paper, implementation details (or even
source code) are rarely included. Both from a computer science perspective and a general science
perspective, this is quite undesirable, as it hampers the reproducibility and extensibility of systems
and empirical studies.
e dierent types of input used are fairly distributed: in about 36% of the ethical machines the
input is dened as logical cases, in 21% the input has a numerical representation, in 30% the input
is wrien in (natural or structured) language, and 34% use (simulated) sensor data as input. Of all
cases, ve selected papers had more than one type of input for their system. Around 25% of the
authors used a (simulated) robot, corresponding with the amount of sensor data used as input.
In terms of user friendliness, the implemented systems score poorly. While it is important to
note many of these machines are in their prototype phase and more focused on the ethics than
the user, it should be important to keep the user in mind from the start of development. Nearly
35% of the machines provide an explanation of their output. 27% process the input automatically,
implying that about three out of four implementations require the user to pre-process the input
manually in some way — which does not make it easy for the user. Only around one out of ve
machines include a user interface and less than 17% oer the option for the user to give feedback.
In summary, there is still plenty of room for improvement as regards user friendliness.
7.4 Interactions Between Dimensions
Given that machine ethics is an interdisciplinary eld, it is interesting to look at the interaction
between the ethical theory types and their implementation, Figure 4 shows the interactions between
ethical theory, ethical implementation approach, and technology type used to implement an ethical
machine. For researchers, it can be useful to see which combinations have not yet been tried
out that might be promising. For example, Figure 4a shows that (to the best of our knowledge)
a hybrid approach (including both top-down and boom-up elements) to implementing pure
consequentialism does not yet exist. Similarly, boom-up approaches to optimization (see Figure
4b) or pure deontological approaches to learning (see Figure 4c) (e.g., seeing which input leads to
behavior adherent to a certain set of rules) have not yet been explored.
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Table 7. Technical classification. 3 implies yes/fully, ◦ implies partially, an empty cell implies no/not present.




































































































3 3 ◦ ◦ Bringsjord et al. 2012 [32]
3 3 ◦ Mermet et al. 2016 [92]
3 3 ◦ Verheij et al. 2016 [134]
Non-monotonic logic (N-M logic) 3 3 3 3 ◦ Ganascia 2007 [58]
Deontic logic (Deon Logic)
3 3 ◦ ◦ ◦ Arkoudas et al. 2005 [12]
3 3 ◦ Furbach et al. 2014 [57]
3 3 ◦ ◦ 3 Malle et al. 2017 [90]
3 3 ◦ Wiegel et al. 2009 [141]
Rule-based system (Rules)
3 3 3 3 Atkinson et al. 2008 [16]
3 3 ◦ 3 Dennis et al. 2015 [49]
3 3 ◦ Dennis et al. 2016 [48]
3 3 ◦ 3 Neto et al. 2011 [97]
3 3 Pontier et al. 2012 [104]
3 3 3 ◦ Tus et al. 2015 [128]
3 Turilli 2007 [129]
Event calculus 3 3 Bonnemains et al. 2018 [29]
Abductive logic 3 3 3 Pereira et al. 2007 [99]
N-M logic + event calculus 3 3 3 ◦ ◦ Berreby et al. 2017 [25]
Rules + KR & ontologies 3 3 3 3 Cointe et al. 2016 [38]
Deon logic + event calculus 3 3 3 3 Govindarajulu et al. 2017 [61]
Probabilistic reasoning (PR) Bayes’ Rule + Markov models 3 ◦ 3 3 Cloos 2005 [37]
Learning (L)
Reinforcement learning 3 3 3 3 ◦ Abel et al. 2016 [1]
3 3 ◦ 3 Wu et al. 2017 [146]
Neural networks 3 ◦ 3 Guarini 2006 [62]
3 3 3 3 3 Honarvar et al. 2009 [75]
NN + Evolutionary computing 3 ◦ ◦ Howard et al. 2017 [79]
Optimization (O) Optimization
3 ◦ ◦ 3 3 Anderson et al. 2004 (Jeremy) [6]
3 ◦ 3 3 3 Anderson et al. 2004 (WD) [6]
3 3 3 Anderson et al. 2008 [3]
3 3 ◦ 3 3 ornton al. 2017 [127]
3 ◦ ◦ 3 Dang et al. 2017 [130]
3 3 3 3 Vanderelst et al. 2018 [132]
Case-based reasoning Case-based reasoning 3 3 ◦ ◦ 3 Ashley et al. 1994 [14]
3 3 3 3 3 McLaren 2003 [91]
LR + L Inductive logic 3 3 3 ◦ 3 3 Anderson et al. 2014 [5]
KR & ontologies + inductive logic 3 ◦ ◦ 3 3 Anderson et al. 2006 [7]
LR + O
Deductive logic + O 3 3 ◦ 3 3 Yilmaz et al. 2017 [147]
Rules + O
3 3 ◦ 3 3 3 3 3 Arkin 2007 [8]
3 3 3 ◦ 3 Cervantes et al. 2016 [35]
3 3 Reed et al. 2016 [108]
3 3 ◦ 3 3 3 3 Shim et al. 2017 [121]
3 3 ◦ 3 3 Wineld et al. 2014 [142]
Rules + abductive logic + O 3 3 3 ◦ Han et al. 2012 [69]
LR + PR
Rules + Bayes’ Rule 3 3 ◦ 3 ◦ ◦ Lindner et al. 2017 [86]
Rules + statistical inference 3 ◦ ◦ 3 3 3 Madl et al. 2015 [89]
3 ◦ 3 3 3 Wallach et al. 2010 [139]
LR + CBR Rules + KR & ontology + CBR 3 ◦ ◦ ◦ Dehghani et al. 2008 [47]
LR + L + O Rules + decision tree + O 3 3 3 Azad-Manjiri 2014 [18]
PR + O Bayes’ Rule + O 3 3 3 Armstrong 2015 [13]
L + O Inductive logic + O 3 3 ◦ Noothigau et al. 2018 [98]
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(a) Ethical theory type versus implementation (b) Implementation versus technology
(c) Ethical theory type versus technology
Fig. 4. Dimension interaction
7.5 General Observations
ere are some general observations to be made about the eld. Firstly, the focus is on one
universal and objective ethical agent. ere are no options for adding cultural inuences or societal
preferences in any of the classied papers. All systems assume the user cannot inuence the output
of the system. A recent publication shows indication of cultural dierences in ethical preferences
[17], and the development of societal preferences within an ethical machine would improve the
chance of acceptance of ethical machines. However, it is still under debate whether the eld should
move towards a “universal moral grammar,” such as that proposed by Mikhail [93].
Secondly, there are some issues inherent to the eld. For instance, there are no benchmarks
to verify if a system is working as it should. ere are no specic tasks to be implemented, no
consensus as to what the correct output is, and few data sets to use in an implementation. A helpful
tool to recur to in this context is the work by Whitley [140], who provides a four-dimensional
schema for analyzing a research eld. Two of the dimensions refer to the uncertainty of the task at
hand, and two refer to the mutual dependence between the elds and scientists in them. e eld
of machine ethics scores highly on all of these dimensions:
High technical task uncertainty: there is unpredictability and variability in which methods
are used in the eld and how results are interpreted. In this regard, it is a fragmented eld.
High strategic task uncertainty: there are problems present in the eld that are valued
dierently (e.g., some authors focus on the theoretical, others on the implementation, and
the ethical theories or even ethical theory types they focus on diverge).
High strategic dependence: there is much disagreement on the relevant topics, so there is a
high reliance on peers for validation and reputation in the eld.
Medium functional dependence: in terms of physical dependence of resources, there is none.
Anyone with a computer can add to the eld; no expensive equipment is needed. However,
there is a high dependence on results of others and acceptance by the eld.
Another potentially helpful perspective can be derived from Whitley’s theory, where the eld of
machine ethics would be a “polycentric oligarchy”, implying there are several independent clusters
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of scholars that conrm each other’s assumptions and do not communicate much with other clusters
that have very dierent views. At rst glance, such clusters can indeed be detected: the multi-agent
norm domain (e.g., [97, 128]), the logical translation of ethical theories (e.g., [61, 69, 99]) or the
modern learning approach to machine ethics (e.g., [1, 146]). While exploratory research in many
directions is valuable, the eld would benet from more standardization and more communication
between clusters to exchange knowledge on ethics and technology.
8 SELECTED PAPER DESCRIPTIONS
For readers that are interested in a more detailed description of the classied papers, the following
section provides a short summary of each of the selected papers. To structure their presentation,
the papers were categorized across two orthogonal dimensions: (i) implementation (top-down,
boom-up, and hybrid, cf. [138]), and (ii) type of ethical theory (deontological, consequentialist,
virtue ethics, particularism).
8.1 Top-Down
is section introduces papers that adopt a top-down approach to implementing ethics.
8.1.1 Deontological Ethics. Among top-down deontological approaches, dierent kinds can be
distinguished: papers that use predetermined given rules for a certain domain, papers focusing on
multi-agent systems (MAS), and other papers that do not t either of these two categories.
Domain rules. In the medical domain, Anderson and Anderson [3] use an interpretation of
the four principles of Beauchamp and Childress [21] from earlier work by Anderson et al. [7]
to create an ethical eldercare system. e system, called Ethel, needs to oversee the medication
intake of patients. Initial information is given by an overseer, including, for example, at what time
medication should be taken, how much harm could be done by not taking the medication, and
the number of hours it would take to reach this maximum harm. Shim et al. [121] also explore
the medical domain, but focus on mediating between caregivers and patients with Parkinson’s
disease. Instead of a constraint-based approach from previous work, their paper builds on the work
by Arkin [8], who employs a rule-based approach. Based on expert knowledge, a set of rules is
created to improve communication quality between patient and caregiver and to ensure that the
communication process is safe and not interrupted. Among other things, each rule has a type
(obligation or prohibition) and response output when triggered. e rules are prohibition rules, for
example about yelling, and obligations rules regarding, for instance, how to keep the patient safe.
ere are verbal and non-verbal cues for each action, retrieved through sensors. For the military
domain, Reed et al. [108] use a model that balances the principles of civilian non-malecence,
military necessity, proportionality, and prospect of success. e resulting principles are ranked
in order of importance. A scenario is used to calibrate the relative ethical violation model by
updating the weight for each principle. en, a survey is conducted to collect both expert and
non-expert assessment of the situation. Rule-based systems trained on human data perform at
the level of human experts. For the air trac domain, Dennis et al. [48] developed the ETHAN
system that deals with situations when civil air navigation regulations are in conict. e system
relates these rules to four hierarchical ordered ethical principles (do not harm people, do not harm
animals, do not damage self, and do not damage property) and develops a course of action that
generates the smallest violation to those principles in case of conict. McLaren [91] collaborated
with the National Society of Professional Engineers to adopt the principles in their code of ethics
for a system called SIROCCO. Its primary goal is to test whether it can apply existing heuristic
techniques to identify the principles and previous cases that are most applicable for the analysis
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of new cases, based on an engineering ethics ontology. SIROCCO accepts a target case in Ethics
Transcription Language, searches relevant details in cases in its knowledge base in Extended Ethics
Transcription Language and produces advised code provisions and relevant known cases.
Multi-Agent Systems (MAS). Wiegel and van den Berg [141] use a Belief-Desire-Intention
(BDI) model to model agents in a MAS seing. eir approach is based on deontic epistemic
action logic, which includes four steps: modelling moral information, creating a moral knowledge
base, connecting moral knowledge to intentions, and including meta-level moral reasoning. Moral
knowledge is linked to intentions and if there is no action that can satisfy the constraints, the
agent will not act. Neto et al. [97] also implement a BDI approach for a MAS. eir focus is on
norm conict: an agent can adopt and update norms, decide which norms to activate based on
the case at hand, its desires, and its intentions. Conict between norms is solved by selecting the
norm that adds most to the achievement of the agent’s intentions and desires. Norm-adherence is
incorporated in the agent’s desires and intentions. Also, Mermet and Simon [92] deal with norm
conicts. ey distinguish between moral rules and ethical rules that come into play when moral
rules are in conict. ey perform a verication of whether their system called GDT4MAS, is able
to choose the correct ethical rule in conict cases.
Other. Bringsjord and Taylor [32] propose a normative approach using what they call “divine-
command ethics”. ey present a divine-command logic intended to be used for lethal autonomous
robots in the military domain. is logic is a natural-deduction proof theory, where input from a
human can be seen as a divine command for the robot. Turilli [129] introduces the concept of the
ethical consistency problem. He is interested in the ethical aspects of information technology in
general. He proposes a generic two-step method that rst translates ethical principles into ethical
requirements, and then ethical requirements into ethical protocols.
8.1.2 Consequentialism. Among papers that use a top-down consequentialist approach, this
survey briey discusses (i) those that focus on the home assistance domain, (ii) those that focus on
safety applications, and (iii) a variety of others.
Home domain. Cloos [37] proposes a service robot for the home environment. e system,
called Utilibot, chooses the action with the highest expected utility. Because of the computational
complexity of consequentialism, the ethical theory is a decision criterion rather than a decision
process. e description of the system seems a realistic thought experiment, mentioning features
the system could have, based on previous research. e system controlling the robot, Wellnet,
consists of Bayesian nets and uses a Markov decision process to optimize its behavior for its policies.
Van Dang et al. [130] focus a similar use case but opt for a dierent technical approach: they
adopt a cognitive agent soware architecture called Soar. e robot is given information about
family members. When it receives a request, each possible action is assigned a utility value for each
general law of robotics as proposed by Asimov. e action with the maximum overall utility is
selected to be executed, which can be to either obey, disobey, or partially obey (meaning proposing
an alternative option for) the human’s request.
Falling prevention. ree related papers focus on the use case where a human and robot (both
represented by a robot in experiments) are navigating a space that has a hole in the ground. e
robot has to decide how to intervene in order to prevent the human from falling into the hole.
Wineld et al. [142] add a “Safety/Ethical Logic” layer that is integrated in a so-called con-
sequence engine. is mechanism for estimating the consequences of actions follows rules very
similar to Asimov’s laws of robotics. ey address each law in an experiment. Dennis et al. [49]
continue the work of Wineld et al. [142], by using and extending their approach, and introduce a
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declarative language that allows the creation of consequence engines within what they name the
“agent infrastructure layer toolkit” (AIL). Systems created with AIL can be formally veried using an
available model checker. e example system that is implemented sums multiple possible unethical
outcomes and minimizes the number of people harmed. Vanderelst and Wineld [132] have a
similar approach and implement two robots representing humans and a robot that follows Asimov’s
laws respectively. In their case study, there are two goal locations, one of which is dangerous, and
the Asimov robot has to intervene.
Other. In early work by Anderson et al. [6], a simple utilitarian system is introduced based on
the theory of Jeremy Bentham that implements act utilitarianism (i.e., calculates utilities of options
and chooses the one with the highest utility).
8.1.3 Particularism. Ashley and McLaren [14] describe a system that “compares cases that
contain ethical dilemmas about whether or not to tell the truth.” ey use a case-based reasoning
approach to compare the dierent cases in its database. e program, called Truth-Teller, compares
dierent real-world situations in terms of relevant similarities and distinctions in justications
for telling the truth or lying. Representations for principles and reasons, truth telling episodes,
comparison rules, and important scenarios are presented.
8.1.4 Hybrid: Specified Hierarchy. is section contains papers that use a top-down ethical
hybrid approach with a specied hierarchy. Dierent groups can be distinguished: papers where
deontological ethics are dominant over consequentialism, and a paper where consequentialism is
dominant over deontological ethics.
Deontological dominance. While the following three systems all have the same approach, they are
very dierent in their implementation. In the system by Dehghani et al. [47], the ethical theory
type is very clear. e system, called MoralMD, has two modes: deontological and utilitarian. A
new case is processed into predicate calculus and the presence of principles and contextual features
are compared to a determined set of rules in a knowledge base. e order of magnitude reasoning
module calculates the relationship between the utility of each choice. If there are no sacred values
involved in the case at hand (i.e., the deontological component), the system will choose the proper
output based on the highest utility (i.e., the consequentialist component). Govindarajulu and
Bringsjord [61] provide a rst-order modal logic to formalize the doctrine of double eect and even
of triple eect: “the deontic cognitive event calculus.” e calculus includes the modal operators
for knowledge, beliefs, desires, and intentions. To be able to be useful in non-logic systems, they
explain what characteristics a system should have to be able to use the proposed approach. e
doctrine of double (and triple) eect combines deontological and consequentialist ethics, where
deontology has a greater emphasis than consequentialism. Pereira and Saptawijaya [99] use
prospective logical programming to model various moral dilemmas taken from the classic trolley
problem and employ the principle of double eect as the moral rule. Once an action has been
chosen, preferences for situations are judged a posteriori by the user. e authors show their
implementation in a program called ACORDA.
Consequentialist dominance . In earlier work, Pontier and Hoorn [104] introduced a “cognitive
model of emotional intelligence and aective decision making” called Silicon Coppélia to be used in
the health domain. An agent has three moral duties (autonomy, benecence, and non-malecence)
with a certain ambition to fulll each duty (i.e., weights). e system’s decisions are based on action-
specic expected utilities and consistency with the predetermined duties. While most authors
make an act utilitarian system, Pontier and Hoorn create a rule utilitarian system by trying to
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maximize the total amount of utility for everyone. While they use rules (i.e., deontological ethics),
they implement them in a consequentialist way, making this the dominant ethical theory type.
8.1.5 Hybrid: Unspecified Hierarchy. Both systems in this category focus on a modular approach,
where dierent ethical theory types can be combined in an ethical machine. e goal of the system
by Berreby et al. [25] is to create a modular architecture to represent ethical principles in a
consistent and adjustable manner. ey qualify what they call “the Good” and “the Right” as the
ethical part of their system (implying both consequentialist and deontological constraints). Besides
these system components, the system consists of an action model (i.e., “it enables the agent to
represent its environment and the changes that take place in it, taking as input a set of performed
actions”) and a causal model (i.e., “it tracks the causal powers of actions, enabling reasoning over
agent responsibility and accountability, taking as input the event trace given by the action model
and a specication of events containing a set of events and of dependence relations”) [25]. e
implementation is done in Answer Set Programming using a modied version of Event calculus.
Using a medical scenario, they provide a proof of concept. Lindner et al. [86] have created a
soware library for modelling “hybrid ethical reasoning agents” called HERA. Based on logic,
they create a prototype called IMMANUEL, which is a robotic face and upper body that users can
interact with. e system’s ethical constraints draw on consequentialist calculations, the Pareto
principle from economics, and the principle of double eect. Uncertainty and belief in permissibly
of an action are added as extra variables in the system.
8.1.6 Configurable ethics. e papers in this subsection have a top-down approach and proposed
various ways in which ethics can be implemented. One paper has machine ethics tailored for a
specic domain, while another uses dierent techniques in a more domain-general way. A third
focuses on multi-agent systems.
Domain-specic. ornton et al. [127] combine deontology, consequentialism, and virtue ethics
to optimize driving goals in automated vehicle control. Constraints and costs on vehicle goals
are determined on the basis of both deontological and consequentialist considerations. Virtue
ethics generates specic goals across vehicle types, such that a trac infraction of an ambulance is
assessed as less costly than that of a taxi cab.
Domain-general. Ganascia [58] claims to be the rst to aempt to model ethical rules with
Answer Set Programming (cf. [19]) to model three types of ethical systems — Aristotelian ethics,
Kantian deontology, and Constant’s “Principles of Politics” (cf. [40]). Drawing on [103] situation
calculus, Bonnemains et al. [29] devise a formalism in which moral dilemmas can be expressed
and resolved in line with distinct ethical systems, including consequentialism and deontological
ethics.
Multi-agent systems. Cointe et al. [38] extend ethical decision making to multi-agent systems.
e judgment function can accommodate a wide variety of inputs and is not restricted to the format
of a single type of ethical system.
8.1.7 Ambiguous. Arkoudas et al. [12] reason that well-behaved robots should be based on
“mechanized formal logics of action, obligation and permissibility”. Aer introducing a domain-
specic deontic logic, they describe a previously published interactive theorem proving system,
Athena, that can be utilized to verify ethical systems based on rst-order logic. Murakami [96]
presented an axiomatization of Horty’s utilitarian formulation of multi-agent deontic logic [77],
while Arkoudas et al. [12] present a sequent-based deduction formulation of Murakami’s system.
While deontic logic is used, each deontic stit frame contains a utility function. e contribution
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lies in the new approach to Murakami’s system, which is implemented and proven in Athena.
In a dierent approach, the proposed system by Cervantes et al. [35] devise a computational
model for moral decision-making inspired by neuronal mechanisms of the human brain. e model
integrates agential preferences, past experience, current emotional states, a set of ethical rules,
as well as certain utilitarian and deontological doctrines as desiderata for the impending ethical
decision.
With an entirely dierent focus, Atkinson and Bench-Capon [16] depart from Hare’s con-
tention [70] that in situations with serious consequences, we engage in complex moral reasoning
rather than the simple application of moral rules and norms. Moral norms are thus considered
not an input to, but an output of serious moral deliberation. e authors model situated moral
reasoning drawing on Action-Based Alternating Transition Systems (cf. [143] as well as [15]).
Verheij [134] draws on Bench-Capon’s framework of value-based argumentation ([22, 23]),
which is inspired by case law (new cases are decided on past cases where there is no clear legislation,
cf. [67]). e paper breaks new ground in so far as the formal model is not restricted to either
qualitative or quantitative primitives, but integrates both.
8.2 Boom-up
is section introduces selected papers that use a boom-up approach to implementing ethics.
8.2.1 Deontological Ethics. Malle et al. [90] argue that robots need to have a norm capacity —
a capacity to learn and adhere to norms. Drawing on deontic logic, the authors explore two distinct
approaches of implementing a norm system in an articial cognitive architecture. Noothigattu
et al. [98] collect data on human ethical decision making to learn societal preferences. ey then
create a system that summarizes and aggregates the results to make ethical decisions.
8.2.2 Consequentialism. Armstrong [13] observes that equipping articial agents directly with
values or preferences can be dangerous (cf. [30]). Representing values as utility functions, the
author proposes a value selection mechanism where existing values do not interfere with the
adoption of new ones. Abel et al. [1] pursue a related goal. In contrast to Armstrong, the agent
does not maximize a changing meta-utility function but instead draws on partially observable
Markov decision processes (cf. [82]) familiar from reinforcement learning. e system is tested
with respect to two moral dilemmas.
8.2.3 Hybrid: Unspecified Hierarchy. Howard and Muntean [79]
In contrast to the dominant action-based models of autonomous articial moral agents, Howard
and Muntean [63] advocate an agent-based model, which combines traits of virtue ethics and par-
ticularism. e implementation draws on neural networks optimized by evolutionary computation
and is given a test run with the NEAT (NeuroEvolution of Augmenting Topologies) package (cf.
[52, 109, 124, 125]).
8.2.4 Ambiguous. Furbach et al. [57] demonstrate how deontic logic can be transformed into
description logic so as to be processed by Hyper—a theorem prover employing hypertableau calculus
by aid of which normative systems can be evaluated and checked for consistency. Wu and Lin
[146] are interested in “ethics shaping” and propose a reinforcement learning model. e laer is




is section introduces selected papers that use a hybrid approach to implement ethics by combining
top-down and boom-up elements.
8.3.1 Deontological Ethics. e following papers, all by the same set of authors, use a hybrid
approach to implement deontological ethics. In 2004, Anderson et al. [6] introduced W.D.: a
system based on the prima facie duties advocated by W.D. Ross. W.D. leaves the encoding of
a situation up to the user, who has to aribute values to the satisfaction and violation of the
duties for each possible action. e system pursues the action with the highest weighted sum
of duty satisfaction. Two years later, Anderson et al. [7] introduced MedEthEx, an advisory
system in medical ethics. MedEthEx has three components: a basic module trained by experts,
a knowledge-based interface that guides users when inpuing a new case, and a module that
provides advice for the new case at hand. In 2014, Anderson and Anderson [5] created GenEth,
a general analyzing system for moral dilemmas. e system is capable of representing a variety of
aspects of dilemmas (situational features, duties, actions, cases, and principles) and can generate
abstract ethical principles by applying inductive logic to solutions of particular dilemma cases. e
principles are evaluated by a self-made Ethical Turing Test: if the system performs as an ethical
expert would, it passes the test.
8.3.2 Particularism. Guarini [62] explores whether neural networks can be employed to imple-
ment particularist ethics, as occasionally hinted at by Dancy, one of particularism’s most renowned
advocates (cf. [43–45]). Using the action/omission distinction (cf. [145] for a review) as a test
paradigm, neural networks are trained with dierent types of cases in order to investigate whether
they can competently judge new ones.
8.3.3 Hybrid: Specified Hierarchy. Arkin [8] explores constraints on the deployment of lethal
autonomous weapons in the baleeld (it was subsequently published as a series of three ar-
ticles [9–11]. e proposed system is predominantly governed by deontological rules, namely
international laws of war and the US Army’s rules of engagement. Its architecture relies on four
central constituents: an Ethical Governor that suppresses lethal action; an Ethical Behavior Control
that constrains behavior in line with the rules; an Ethical Adaptor, which can update the agent’s
constraint set to a more restrictive one; and a Responsibility Advisor, which is the human-robot
interaction part of the system.
Azad-Manjiri [18] develops an architecture for a deontological system constrained by Beauchamp
and Childress’s biomedical principles. e system determines its actions on the basis of said prin-
ciples and a decision tree algorithm trained with expert ethicist judgments in a variety of cases
from the biomedical domain. Building on early work by Ganascia [59], Tuş and Ganascia [128]
augment a belief-desire-intention rational agent model with normative constraints. ey devote par-
ticular aention to the problem arising from the acquisition of new norms, which frequently stand
in conict with existing ones (for an alternative approach building on the belief-desire-intention
model, see Honarvar and Ghasem-Aghaee [75, 76] discussed below).
8.3.4 Hybrid: Unspecified Hierarchy. Yilmaz et al. [147] survey the eld of machine ethics and
propose a coherence-driven reective equilibrium model (cf. [107]), by aid of which conicts across
heterogenous interests and values can be resolved. Honarvar and Ghasem-Aghaee [75] build a
belief-desire-intention agent model whose decisions are based on a number of weighted features
drawn from hedonic act utilitarianism (e.g., the amount of pleasure and displeasure for the agent
and other parties aected by the action).
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8.3.5 Ambiguous. Most of the work of Saptawijaya and Pereira (c.f. [99–101, 115–117]) focuses
on logic programming and prospective logic to model ethical machines. In Han et al. [69], they
introduce uncertainty as a factor in decision making and draw on abductive logic to accommodate
it. Madl and Franklin [89] call for limits on ethical machines for safety reasons. Developing on
Franklin et al.’s [56] LIDA architecture—an articial general intelligence (AGI) model of human
cognition—they suggest that deliberate actions could be constrained top-down during run time, and
ethical meta-rules (such as certain Kantian principles) could be implemented on a metacognitive
level. Rather than start from a complete set of rules, the laer can gradually expand. e approach
is exemplied by CareBot, an assistive simulated bot for the home care domain. Wallach et al.
[139] also discuss the LIDA model. ey demonstrate how emotions can be integrated into a
LIDA-based account of the human decision making process and extend the approach to articial
moral agents.
9 FUTURE AVENUES AND LIMITATIONS
Based on the results of the analysis and description of the selected papers, some literature gaps are
identied that can be of interest for future work. Additionally, the limitations of this survey are
discussed.
Ethical dimension. In view of earlier calls for hybrid systems when it comes to ethical theory,
a surprisingly low percentage of authors consider a multi-theory approach in which machines
can interchangeably apply dierent theories depending on the type of situation. In terms of the
content (and not the structure) of ethical theories, it is important to acknowledge and harness the
nuances of specic theories, but human morality is complex and cannot be captured by one single
classical ethical theory. Even experts can have rational disagreement amongst themselves on an
ethical dilemma. is leads to the next important point: an ethical machine will not be of use if it is
not accepted by its users, which can be the risk of focusing on one ethical theory and, thus, not
covering human morality. Ethical theory needs to be combined with domain-specic ethics as
accepted by domain experts and, as identied in the analysis of this paper, this is not the case in
the majority of the related work. Moreover, it is necessary to discuss the ethical theory/theories in
the system with its possible users. Some examples of using folk morality in machine ethics can
be found in Noothigau et al. [98], as well as in [111]. However, it is important to note that just as
ethical theories have their challenges, so does folk morality. ree challenges are who to include in
the group whose values should be considered (standing), how to obtain their values (measurement),
and how to aggregate their values (aggregation) [20]. Implementations should start from ethical
theories combined with domain-specic ethical theory, aer which acceptance by the users and
deviation from socially accepted norms should be discussed (cf. e.g., [17, 28, 85, 118]).
Implementation dimension. ere is a need for more systematic evaluations when ethical ma-
chines are created in order to be able to rate and compare systems. To this end, there is a strong
need for domain-specic benchmarks. Based on input from domain experts, data sets need to
be created containing the types of cases prevalent in that domain, with respect to which ethical
machines must be assessed. e gathering of typical tasks and respective answers that domain
experts agree on is just as important as the actual creation of ethical machines. is implies the
need for more collaboration between elds. Computer scientists and philosophers, as well as
domain experts and social science experts, have to work together to ensure the interaction with
and eects of the ethical machines are as desired. Even within the eld, collaboration is needed
between dierent clusters of topics in the eld of machine ethics, for example between clusters
specializing in MAS and machine learning respectively. Finally, in general, implementation
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requires more aention. While on a higher level, theoretical discussion remains important in this
eld, especially to prepare for possible future scenarios, the testing of theory in practice can enrich
the discussion on what is (or is not) possible at that moment and what practical implementations
and consequences certain ethical machines can have.
Technical dimension. When a system is implemented, it is imperative to provide exhaustive
specication detail, including availability of the code, which is predominantly lacking. Another
frequent shortcoming regards usability: the system should have a user interface so that the future
user can interact with the system without having to know how to code. Furthermore, automatic
processing of input cases deserves more aention, so as to avoid having to encode each variable
manually as a vector for a neural network. Considering the increased need for transparency in
algorithmic decision making, as well as the fundamental role of reasons in ethics, the system should
also provide an explanation of why it took a certain decision. In a next phase, the user should be
able to give feedback on the ethical decision the system makes. Finally, the association of a given
type of technology with a certain type of ethics requires an adequate technical justication, beyond
using just the most acquainted technology.
Further Points of Interest. Current technology allows for successful application of narrow AI
geared towards specic tasks. While steps are being taken towards AGI, the technology does not
yet exist [80]. Hence, domain-specic applications seem suitable. A domain-specic non-AGI
approach to machine ethics alleviates some of the risks and limitations on machine ethics posed
by [33], such as those related to an “insucient knowledge and/or computational resources for
the situation at hand.” However, there are still risks and limitations. For instance, in the context
of lethal autonomous weapons systems, the loss of “meaningful human control” [114] is a risk,
as humans would not have the same control over ethical decisions such as target selection. A
limitation of using domain-specic ethical machines is that the process of one domain may not be
transferable to other domains. Furthermore, not everyone is ready to accept a machine taking over
the ethical decision making process [73].
A slightly dierent way to address ethics in machines is to dene (and implement) an ethical
decision support, rather than leaving the machine to make an autonomous ethical decision. For
an overview of dierent types of moral mediation, see Van de Voort et al. [131]. Etzioni agrees
that the focus should lie on decision support, stating “there seem to be very strong reasons to
treat smart machines as partners, rather than as commanding a mind that allows them to function
on their own” [51, p. 412]. One of those reasons is that AGI will not exist in the foreseeable
future. is approach will also help with acceptance of machines with ethical considerations in
society. ere are dierent possible levels of autonomy the system can have, for example only
summarizing available data, interpreting available data, summarizing possible actions, or even
suggesting/pre-selecting a possible action the system deems best. Dierent types of support and
collaboration might be necessary for dierent applications, and according to the literature review
done in this paper, further research is needed in this direction.
Limitations. is survey has some limitations that need to be mentioned. First of all, the scope of
the paper selection was limited to explicit ethical theories (i.e., theories directly programmed into
the machine). While some of the works reviewed can still be of interest and provide inspiration
for implementation, papers devoid of implementation details were excluded from this survey.
Examples are emerging ethics based on human data to research folk morality (e.g., [146]) or models
of human morality to determine relevant features in input cases (e.g., [136]). Furthermore, we
limited the survey to one paper per author whenever similar systems were discussed across multiple
publications, selecting the most comprehensive one. is does not do full justice to the work of
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certain authors (e.g., Guarini working on explainability of neural networks making ethical decision
[63]). While the paper selection procedure was designed to be as exhaustive as possible, it is still
possible that a few important papers were missed. Finally, three authors reviewed the ethical
dimension and two reviewed the implementation and technical dimension, but it is still possible
there was bias in the classication due to the limited number of people involved in the classication
process and the process of discussion until agreement was reached.
10 CONCLUSION
e future of the eld of machine ethics will depend on advances in both technology and ethical
theory. Until new breakthroughs change the eld, it is important to acknowledge what has been
done so far and the avenues of research that make sense to pursue in the near future. To accomplish
this, the contribution of this survey is threefold. Firstly, a classication taxonomy with three
dierent dimension is introduced: the ethical dimension, the dimension considering implementing
ethics into a machine, and the technical dimension. Secondly, an exhaustive selection of papers
describing machine ethics implementations is presented, summarized, and classied according
to the introduced taxonomies. Finally, based on the classication, a trend analysis is presented
that leads to some recommendations on future research foci. It is important to keep in mind how
machine ethics can be used in a meaningful way for its users, with increasing agreement on what a
system should do, and in what context.
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